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Economic  migration 
allows  people  to  move 
from places where they 
are  less  productive 
to  places  where  they 
are  more  productive. 
Global  economic  output  is  thereby  increased. 
Furthermore,  migration  helps  to  decouple 
economic  opportunity  from  place  of  birth. 
Global equality of opportunity is improved as a 
result. These are powerful arguments in favour of 
migration in a world where geographic income 
differences are substantial.
Global income differences significant enough to 
trigger large-scale migration were already present 
20 years ago. However, at the time there were 
three major barriers to migration: immigration 
restrictions  in  rich  countries;  emigration 
restrictions, especially in communist countries; 
and a lack of necessary funds and information 
for potential migrants. 
With  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall,  emigration 
restrictions  have  largely  disappeared.  And  as 
a result of globalisation, the proportion of the 
world population with access to the necessary 
funds and information to engage in economic 
migration is on the increase. As the principal 
remaining barrier, the immigration restrictions 
of  rich  countries  are  increasingly  exposed  to 
rising immigration pressures.
For the sake of global economic efficiency and 
equality  of  opportunity,  these  immigration 
restrictions should be relaxed, but public opinion 
in many rich countries is in favour of tightening 
them. In a recent FT/Harris poll on migration 
attitudes,1 40% of the respondents in France and 
more than 0% in the other countries surveyed 
(United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Germany) replied 
that there were too many immigrants in their 
country  and  that  their  country’s  immigration 
policy was making it too easy for migrants to 
enter legally.
Why is the call for more restrictive immigration 
so widespread? Clearly, there are concerns about 
failed  integration  and  the  risk  of  an  ethnic 
underclass emerging in a number of European 
countries.  Due  to  recent  terrorist  attacks  and 
terrorist attempts involving Muslim immigrants, 
there are worries about Muslim fundamentalism 
among  immigrant  populations.  Negative 
personal experiences with immigrants, sometimes 
too readily generalised when undercurrents of 
xenophobia  are  present,  can  also  play  a  role.
But I believe that the most important reason 
for the negative public response to immigration 
is  widespread  uncertainty  about  the  future 
consequences of substantial further immigration. 
What will be the impact on employment and 
wages? What will be the impact on the budget 
and the welfare systems? What will be the impact 
on local communities, on public institutions, on 
the identity of the host country in the long run?
In many European countries, the core of society 
is profoundly uncertain what the answers to these 
legitimate questions are. This uncertainty leads 
to the understandable desire to err on the side 
of caution when it comes to immigration policy. 
It would be both unfair and counterproductive 
to accuse the average citizen of irrational fear or 
dislike of foreigners because of that caution. 
Instead, the public discourse needs to embrace 
that caution. The real question is this: what does 
1  Financial Times, 20 October 200.
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a cautious immigration policy offering low risk 
and high returns look like? For far too long, it 
was assumed that a cautious immigration policy 
would essentially be passive or defensive. The 
present challenge for immigration policy makers 
is  to  become  more  systematic  and  proactive 
about being cautious. What we need is a risk 
management approach to immigration policy.
An impact matrix for migration policy
In order to develop that approach, it is essential to 
better understand the risks and the opportunities 
involved. It turns out that they vary substantially 
with the skill level of the migrants. Hence, it is 
worth taking a closer look at the likely impact of 
high-skill and of low-skill migration on the three 
principal relevant actors in immigration policy: 
the rich host country, the poor source country, 
and the migrants themselves. 
The host country perspective 
Immigration will typically increase the economic 
output of a country. In that sense, immigration 
is a source of GDP growth. However, only part 
of  that  increased  output  will  accrue  to  local 
workers and local owners of capital. A substantial 
portion of the increased output will go to the 
immigrants. Another portion of the gains will go 
to foreign owners of local capital. 
Since locals may receive only a small part of the 
output gain due to migration, it is essential to 
carefully examine the potentially adverse effects 
that critics of immigration routinely point to: 
(a) the impact on wages and employment; (b) 
the fiscal impact; and (c) the impact on social 
capital.
The impact on wages and employment 
The impact on wages and employment in the 
host country is likely to be negative for those 
local workers who have skills similar to those 
of the immigrants. By contrast, the impact on 
wages and employment is likely to be positive 
for the local workers who have skills that are 
different  and  complementary  to  those  of  the 
immigrants. 
Low-skill immigration may somewhat increase 
income inequality as the below-average wages of 
low-skilled locals come under downward pressure 
and the above-average wages of complementary 
highly  skilled  locals  receive  a  small  boost.  By 
an analogous argument, high-skill immigration 
could be expected to have a benign distributional 
impact by somewhat reducing the above-average 
wages  of  high-skilled  locals  and  somewhat 
increasing the below-average wages of the low 
skilled.
However, most empirical studies find that the 
wage  and  employment  effects  of  immigration 
are very small, and many find no effects at all 
(Longhi et al., 2005, 200). At the upper end 
of  the  range,  Borjas  (2003)  estimates  that  an 
immigration influx of 1% reduces the wages of 
local workers who are similar to the immigrants 
with  respect  to  the  labour  market  by  0.3  to 
0.4%.
But when are immigrants similar to locals with 
respect to the labour market? In pursuing that 
question  further,  Ottaviano  and  Peri  (200) 
find  that  the  labour  market  treats  locals  and 
immigrants  as  near  substitutes  only  for  the 
lowest  skill  groups.  In  contrast,  higher-skilled 
immigrants and locals appear to be sufficiently 
different that they generally do not hurt each 
other’s  employment  and  wage  prospects. 
In  other  words,  the  wage  and  employment 
impact of high-skill immigration appears to be 
fairly  unproblematic.  However,  the  empirical 
literature has not been able to comprehensively 
dispel the distributional concerns regarding low-
skill immigration. This message is reinforced by 
the fact that European labour markets for low-
skilled workers are generally less flexible than the 
labour markets for high-skilled workers. 
The fiscal impact 
The  fiscal  policies  currently  in  place  tend  to 
redistribute from the rich to the poor and from the  working-age  population  to  the  inactive 
population and pensioners in particular. Hence, 
the net fiscal impact of a high-skilled immigrant 
tends to be substantially more favourable than 
the net fiscal impact of low-skilled immigrants. 
Because immigrants are overwhelmingly young 
adults,  even  relatively  low-skilled  immigrants 
may  have  a  positive  net  fiscal  impact.  Bonin 
(2002),  for  example,  found  that  the  average 
immigrant in Germany has a positive net fiscal 
impact across his or her lifespan despite the high 
proportion of low-skilled immigrants. However, 
a  similar  study  by  Roodenburg  et  al.  (2003) 
found  that  immigration  had  a  negative  net 
impact on public finances.
The impact on social capital
Unfortunately,  the  impact  of  immigration 
on  social  capital  is  much  more  difficult  to 
estimate and quantify. However, there are some 
indications that high levels of immigration may 
alter  the  dynamics  of  local  communities  in 
problematic ways. 
Alesina  and  La  Ferrara  (2000),  for  example, 
found  that  participation  in  social  activities  is 
significantly lower in more ethnically fragmented 
US  communities.  Entorf  and  Lauk  (200) 
identify significant negative peer effects on the 
school performance of immigrants in Germany 
and  Austria  with  their  non-comprehensive 
school systems. Furthermore, there are worrying 
signs  that  certain  immigrant  communities  in 
Europe are developing into an ethnic underclass. 
Again, those dangers would appear to be less 
pronounced for high-skilled than for low-skilled 
migrants. 
However,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that 
communities  can  also  benefit  greatly  from 
cultural and ethnic diversity. This goes far beyond 
the clichéd observation that the local restaurant 
scene will benefit from such diversity. For many 
of the most successful companies in the world it 
is essential to operate in places where they can 
pull together the best experts from all over the 
world. Locations unable to accommodate such 
diversity are therefore at risk of falling behind.
Hence, despite some challenges that immigration 
poses  for  the  social  cohesion  of  society,  large 
immigrant cities like London and New York are 
thriving. This suggests that the negative effects 
of migration on social capital can be dwarfed by 
the attractions of international cities, including 
those  directly  related  to  migration  such  as 
cultural diversity and entrepreneurial spirit. 
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Bringing the various effects together, it seems 
likely that high-skilled immigrants would tend 
to have a net positive impact on the locals in 
the host country, as indicated by a ‘+’ in the 
impact  matrix  (Figure  1).  The  case  appears 
to  be  somewhat  less  clear-cut  for  low-skill 
immigration, as indicated by a ‘?’.
The source country perspective
By  moving  a  factor  of  production  abroad, 
emigration  is  likely  to  decrease  the  economic 
output  of  the  source  country.  In  that  sense, 
emigration  may  slow  GDP  growth.  However, 
that decrease in output will, to a large extent, 
be  borne  by  the  emigrants  who  expect  to  be 
better  off  abroad  and  may  send  remittances 
back  home.  Some  of  the  decrease  in  output 
will likely be borne by local and foreign owners 
of capital. The net impact on those remaining 
behind in the source country is not entirely clear. 
To explore this question further, we will briefly 
reflect on the impact on wages and employment, 
public finances, and the importance of altruistic 
family links between the migrants and those who 
remain in the source country.
The impact on wages and employment 
Low-skill  emigration  or  ‘brawn  drain’  would 
tend to increase the wages and employment of 
low-skilled  workers  in  the  source  country  by 
making them relatively more scarce. By contrast, 
the  wages  of  skilled  workers  would  likely  be 
reduced since they are becoming relatively more 
abundant. Taken together, the effects of these 
two would be to reduce inequality.
High-skill  emigration  or  ‘brain  drain’  would 
tend to increase the wages of the high skilled 
and reduce the wages of the low skilled, thereby 
increasing inequality in the source country. To 
the extent that wage inequality is undesirable, 
the effect of low-skill emigration would appear 
to be somewhat preferable to that of high-skill 
emigration. Moreover, brain drain could have a 
negative impact on the growth potential of the 
source country’s economy by depriving it of its 
innovation potential.
Public finances 
To  the  extent  that  the  high  skilled  are  more 
important  net  contributors  to  public  finances 
during  their  life  cycle,  their  emigration  tends 
to  hurt  public  finances  more.  If  education 
is  provided  by  the  state,  this  negative  effect 
is  reinforced  because  high-skilled  emigrants 
would tend to have received greater government 
subsidies for their education before they leave.
But brain drain may not be entirely negative for 
the source country. The option to emigrate may 
substantially  increase  the  expected  returns  on 
education, thereby improving private education 
incentives.  Also,  if  migrants  return  to  their 
country of origin, and many of them do, the 
skills and savings that they have acquired abroad 
become  a  powerful  force  for  development. 
Moderate levels of brain drain, therefore, may 
actually be beneficial for the source country as is 
argued by Beine et al. (2003), for example.
Altruistic links 
Finally, there are altruistic links between migrants 
and locals in the source country. Migrants feel 
altruistic towards their families back home and 
help  them  by  sending  back  remittances  on  a 
grand scale that easily exceeds development aid 
budgets. But altruism is also relevant in the other 
direction. Many parents in poor countries would 
welcome it if their children found a better life 
abroad, even in the total absence of remittances. 
This last aspect is often overlooked, but may offer 
an important explanation why so few attempts 
are made by source countries to impose at least 
some financial restrictions on emigration, such 
as  asking  high-skilled  emigrants  to  pay  back 
their education subsidies.
When the various effects are considered together, 
it seems plausible that low-skill emigration would 
tend to have a positive impact on the locals in 
the source country, as indicated by a ‘+’ in the 
impact matrix (Figure 1). The case appears to be 
somewhat less clear-cut for high-skill emigration, 
as indicated by a ‘?’.The migrant perspective
Migrants  migrate  because  they  expect  to  be 
better off as a result of the move. And despite 
some  disappointments  because  of  exaggerated 
expectations or plain bad luck, the overwhelming 
majority  of  migrants  can  be  regarded  as  the 
winners  in  the  migration  process.  Therefore, 
the  impact  of  migration  on  both  high-skilled 
and  low-skilled  migrants  would  appear  to  be 
overwhelmingly positive, as indicated by a ‘++’ 
in the impact matrix.
The  key  problem  for  migrants  lies  elsewhere, 
on  the  border  between  economic,  social,  and 
psychological consequences. Migrants and their 
families will initially compare their lives abroad 
to the lives they would have led in their countries 
of origin. The large majority of migrants will 
see themselves as winners in that comparison. 
But  with  time,  the  migrants  and  especially 
their children may begin an identity transition. 
Increasingly,  success  and  failure,  justice  and 
injustice will be defined in comparison to the 
lives of others in their new home country.
Unfortunately,  the  outcome  of  that  new 
comparison  is  often  much  less  favourable.  In 
many countries, migrants suffer from professional 
and  educational  underachievement  compared 
to otherwise similar locals. Migrants are over-
represented  in  jobs  with  low  social  prestige, 
typically are at a higher risk of unemployment, 
and  suffer  from  subtle  and  sometimes  not-
so-subtle  forms  of  discrimination.  Ironically, 
it  may  be  precisely  during  this  process  of 
integration—this  transition  from  migrant  to 
native identity—that migrants come to regard 
themselves as victims in a hostile host society, 
as losers. Their sense of injustice is due not to 
an objective worsening of their situation but to 
raised ambitions and expectations.
These  aspirations  of  integrating  migrants  are 
bound to clash with those of established locals 
if the latter continue to think, “Couldn’t these 
migrants just go back home if they don’t like 
it here?” Positively managing the expectations 
of migrants and locals alike to avoid this clash 
is  perhaps  the  most  important  challenge  for 
integration policy. 
Specifically, the host society should only try to 
tax  the  financial  gains  of  immigrants  during 
the early years of the immigration experience. 
This is often done through delayed integration 
of immigrants into the welfare state, but even 
some form of explicit entry fee for immigrants to 
be reimbursed with time can make sense under 
certain conditions. After this initial period, any 
discrimination of that sort needs to be phased 
out.  In  addition,  positive  programmes  of 
integration may often be required. Hence, the 
host society is unable to impose a heavy net tax 
on the large migration gains of immigrants.
Policy implications
After  this  detailed  discussion  of  the  impact 
of  migration,  two  key  uncertainties  remain: 
the impact of low-skilled immigration on the 
host  country  and  the  impact  of  high-skilled 
emigration on the source country. What, then, 
should a cautious immigration policy look like 
that addresses these uncertainties?
Universal migration restrictions 
The  traditional  approach  has  been  to  try  to 
impose universal legal restrictions to reduce the 
migration inflow. However, such restrictions are 
much more effective at reducing the inflow of 
high-skilled immigrants than that of low-skilled 
immigrants. High-skilled migrants will be more 
readily diverted to other countries that welcome 
them with open arms. By contrast, low-skilled 
migrants typically have less choice, and irregular 
employment for low-skilled workers is more easily 
arranged. Thus, universal migration restrictions 
bias the influx of immigrants towards low-skilled 
and irregular migration. According to the impact 
matrix, this would tend to be unattractive for the 
host country.
This seems to be particularly true for the EU. 
Family  reunification,  which  typically  accounts 
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for more than 50% of total immigration, will 
continue to attract significant numbers of low-
skilled  immigrants  in  any  case.  In  addition, 
irregular immigration flows to the EU are set to 
increase even more over the coming years.
The  US  experience  with  very  substantial 
irregular (low-skill) immigration from Mexico 
might  serve  as  an  interesting  benchmark.  In 
2004,  there  were  an  estimated  10.5  million 
Mexican immigrants residing in the US, roughly 
0% of them illegally. The illegal inflow from 
Figure 2: Income differences between the EU and the Us and neighbouring countries
Mexico may exceed 400,000 migrants per year. 
Geographic proximity and a GDP per capita in   
Mexico at roughly one quarter of the US level 
(compared at purchasing power parity) appear 
to be key drivers of that development (Figure 
2).
By contrast, the average GDP per capita in the 
12 new EU Member States stands at roughly one 
half of the average GDP per capita level in EU-
15. This much smaller income difference might 
explain why the predicted and so far observed 
legal and irregular migration rate from the new 
Member  States  to  the  EU-15  has  remained 
well below migration from Mexico to the US. 
However,  the  income  differentials  between 
the  EU-15  and  the  (potential)  EU  accession 
countries,  namely  Turkey  and  the  Balkan 
countries,  are  more  comparable  to  the  US-
Mexico situation. And the income differentials 
between the EU-15 and the EU neighbourhood 
countries  are,  on  average,  greater  than  that 
between the US and Mexico.
Against this background, the traditional cautious 
approach to immigration policy would appear 
to be an ill-suited response to Europe’s future 
migration challenges. Instead, future migration 
policies  need  to  focus  more  on  adequately 
rewarding the host countries for accepting their 
inevitable share of uncertainty due to the likely 
and  perhaps  inevitable  inflow  of  low-skilled 
workers. 
Skill-mixing 
When we look at the impact matrix, it is clear 
that the host country could benefit in one of 
three ways: the gains for migrants, the gains for 
the source countries of low-skilled migrants, or 
the gains from attracting high-skilled migrants 
to the host country. 
However, as explained in the previous section, 
it  would  be  difficult  to  tax  heavily  the  gains 
of  migrants.  And  transfers  from  poor  source 
Data: IMFcountries  to  rich  host  countries  are  difficult 
to  justify  from  a  development  perspective. 
Therefore, it would not be advisable to base a 
cautious  immigration  strategy  on  these  two 
uncertain sources of compensation. 
Instead,  a  cautious  immigration  strategy  will 
need to rely heavily on attracting high-skilled 
immigrants to balance the overall skill mix of 
immigration. Reassuringly, the resulting mix of 
low-skilled and high-skilled immigration would 
also help to accommodate the interests of poor 
source countries.
Classic  immigration  countries  like  Canada, 
Australia  and  the  US  have  demonstrated  for 
decades  that  it  is  possible  to  attract  highly 
skilled  migrants  to  improve  the  skill  mix  of 
immigration. Canada and Australia in particular 
have very successful skill-based points systems to 
that effect.
But what if other countries followed suit? Would 
those other countries simply be competing for 
the same scarce international supply of skilled 
labour? Fortunately, the number of students in 
tertiary  education  has  increased  dramatically 
over the last 15 years. For example, the number 
of students in the EU neighbourhood countries 
and Russia has increased from 9 million to 1 
million  during  that  period.  In  the  10  most 
populous countries outside the US and Europe, 
the increase has been even more striking. There, 
the number of students has increased from 1 
million to 42 million. As a result, these countries 
now have more students than the enlarged EU 
and the US combined.
The Role of the EU 
Now is a good time for the EU to join the global 
competition for talent. Member States can do so 
individually by introducing point systems that 
are tailored to their specific needs. In addition, 
an EU-wide ‘Blue Card’ (von Weizsäcker, 200) 
could  be  introduced  for  those  highly  skilled 
workers  who  would  be  welcome  all  over  the 
EU,  granting  them  access  to  the  entire  EU 
labour market. This European version of the US 
Green Card could be allocated through a points 
system. 
This  Blue  Card  would  help  to  attract  more 
highly skilled migrants to the EU than purely 
national schemes because of its greater value for 
subsequent employment. Accepting a first job in 
Amsterdam is more attractive if the option for 
the next job is the whole of the EU, not only the 
Netherlands.
 
But how would this net increase in high-skill 
immigration  through  a  Blue  Card  system  be 
distributed  over  individual  Member  States? 
Small Member States stand to benefit most since 
the difference in value of any national scheme 
compared  to  an  EU-wide  scheme  would  be 
greatest. But large Member States are also likely 
to  benefit  significantly  as  they  would  gain  in 
attractiveness compared to key competitors like 
the US, Canada and Australia. 
In  conclusion,  it  seems  clear  that  a  cautious 
immigration policy will require decisive action 
to better balance the skill mix of immigration 
inflows.  The  EU  Commission  is  currently 
preparing  a  draft  directive  on  high-skilled 
immigration for September 2007. If we do not 
make the best use of this opportunity, we risk 
falling  behind  in  the  global  competition  for 
talent. Furthermore, we risk forgoing adequate 
compensation for the uncertainty surrounding 
the effects of the increased inflow of low-skilled 
migrants which the EU should expect to take 
place over the coming decades.
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